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Party Competition Structure in Eastern Europe:
Aggregate Uniformity versus Idiosyncratic Diversity?
Jan Rovny
Sciences Po, Paris CEE / LIEPP, and University of Gothenburg, CERGU
The literature on party competition structure in eastern Europe varies between aggre-
gated large-N studies that propose uniform patterns of party competition across the 
region on the one hand, and disaggregated, case-focused studies identifying a plurality 
of country-specific patterns on the other. This article finds that both suffer from theo-
retical weaknesses. The aggregated works, arguing for common unidimensionality of 
party competition in the region, overlook significant cross-national differences, while 
the case-focused works, suggesting country-specific multidimensionality, do not iden-
tify commonalities. In effect, both sets of research fall short in explaining the variance of 
party competition in eastern Europe. This article consequently argues for the impor-
tance of bridging these findings of aggregate uniformity and idiosyncratic diversity 
through the use of refined theoretical explanations of party competition patterns in the 
region. To demonstrate the plausibility and utility of such an approach, the article 
builds a theoretical model of party competition in eastern Europe, and tests it by esti-
mating the vote for left-wing parties across ten eastern European countries using the 
2009 European Election Study.
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Introduction
How parties compete for representation and power in eastern europe has gener-
ated substantial academic interest over the past quarter century since the region 
commenced its transition to democracy. generating increasingly sophisticated 
research, the literature on party competition in the region can be divided into two 
broad groups. a first set of works has concentrated on structural aspects of party 
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competition, studying the social bases of political parties, their organization, and the 
formal characteristics of party systems. This literature provides rather somber con-
clusions, suggesting that “stable organizational structures, institutional certainties, 
and relatively closed structures of competition . . . tend to be marked by their 
absence”1 in eastern europe. a second, alternative line of research has focused on 
individual voter and party characteristics, exploring their relative positions and pref-
erences. This literature, on the contrary, finds that despite “these fluid party sys-
tems,” political competition is structured and “policy-based to a significant degree.”2
The review of the field suggests that these studies leave us with a number of unan-
swered questions. The literature varies between aggregated large-N works that pro-
pose uniform structures of party competition across the region on the one hand, and 
disaggregated, case-focused studies identifying a plurality of country-specific pat-
terns on the other. Both suffer from theoretical weaknesses. The aggregated works, 
arguing for common unidimensionality of party competition in the region, overlook 
significant cross-national differences in party competition, while the case-focused 
works, suggesting country-specific multidimensionality, do not identify commonali-
ties. In effect, both sets of research fall short in explaining the variance of party 
competition in eastern europe.
This article argues for the importance of bridging these findings of aggregate 
uniformity and idiosyncratic diversity through the use of refined theoretical explana-
tions of party competition patterns in the region. It suggests that the discipline is in a 
position to generate and test expectations of party competition patterns that capture 
country specifics, not through idiosyncratic indicators but rather though more sensi-
tive theory building. The article argues for the centrality of not only economic pre-
dictors, which have been extensively considered by research to date, but also 
predictors concerning ethnicity, state-building, and religiosity. While none of these 
are new to students of eastern european party competition, their combined usage in 
explaining party competition is strikingly rare.
The article first reviews the literature on party competition in eastern europe, 
highlighting a number of questions raised by this research. In suggesting how these 
questions might be answered, the article proposes a set of predictors and relation-
ships determining party competition in the region. To demonstrate the plausibility 
and utility of such an approach, the article proposes a vote choice model that it tests 
on data from ten eastern european countries using the 2009 european election Study. 
The article concludes that with appropriate theorization, we may do rather well in 
explaining party competition and voting behavior in eastern europe.
Studying Party Competition Patterns in Eastern Europe
The traditional view of party competition in eastern europe focuses on the com-
parison between eastern party systems and their western counterparts from the 
perspective of classical cleavage theory as formulated by Lipset and Rokkan.3 It is a 
structural approach, taking societies, parties, or party systems as units of analysis and 
concentrating on three research components: First, these works seek to identify the 
social structures and divisions central to the Lipset-Rokkan cleavage argument. 
Second, they study party organization as the political expression of these social 
divides. Finally, they address the systemic interplay between parties and society, 
using traditional party system indicators, such as the effective number of parties, and 
measures of electoral volatility. On the whole, they provide a pessimistic view of 
eastern european party competition, which they see as uprooted, ideologically under-
specified, organizationally weak, personalistic, and unstable. Moreover, they suggest 
that these traits are not simply a symptom of the temporary tumult of democratic 
transition. In the words of Peter Mair, “the electorate and the parties are different.”4
according to this view, the electorate lacks stable social structure and political 
identity. The turmoil of the twentieth century wiped clean many historical cleav-
ages, “nor is it easy to identify new and contemporary cleavages.”5 The experience 
of communism is seen as a social leveling, meaning that “social groups in post-
communist society . . . do not have a clear sense of what is in their interest and what 
is not.”6 as for party organization, the rapid democratization of a number of east-
ern european countries led to instantaneous power gains of political parties, pre-
cluding incremental, bottom–up organizational development.7 Instead, party 
construction is an elite-dominated, top–down process, often directed from within 
parliaments after initial elections.8 Consequently, party organization is weak, 
inducing party mergers and splits that convolute the political landscape.9 To ensure 
a certain level of stability, eastern european parties rely on the penetration of the 
state to secure universal public funding,10 on increased use of preelectoral coali-
tions,11 and on the adoption of broad catch-all strategies vis-à-vis the voters.12 This 
ideologically opaque character of parties is further deepened by the necessity of 
economic liberalization, and later by the exigencies of european Union accession, 
which set the political agenda, circumscribing competition and ideological differ-
entiation.13 Finally, the party systems are fluid and open. The effective number of 
parties in eastern european party systems is significantly higher than in older 
democracies,14 while the level of party system institutionalization is significantly 
lower.15 In sum, “the political scene in the post-communist region is still character-
ized by considerable ‘political noise’ with numerous contending parties, weak 
political actors and floating constituencies.”16
The theoretical frame of this literature is largely structural, seeking to identify 
the social frames of partisan support, the organizational foundations of parties, or 
the institutional features of the party system. This leads it to employ either qualita-
tive, historical approaches, or—as in the case of the electoral and party systems 
literature—quantitative macroindicators measuring party vote shares and party num-
bers. Studies using quantitative data on individual political parties or voters are 
almost absent from these analyses.17
The conclusions of this literature contrast the experience of eastern european 
party competition with that of the west. However, the western european standards of 
rooted social cleavages underpinning party organization, party–voter linkage, and 
party system stability are concepts borrowed not from contemporary western societ-
ies, but rather from a stylized conception of the historical heyday of mass partisan 
democracy of the early twentieth century. as Lewis suggests, “the weak links of 
many new parties with well-defined social groups and the increasingly professional 
approach taken to the critical task of winning elections suggest the growing associa-
tion of east european parties with variants of the catch-all and electoral professional 
party”18 defined by scholars of western democracies. The eastern experience is 
unique in that local parties often skipped the historical trajectory starting with cleav-
age-based mass parties, rather arriving directly at strategic, issue-oriented organiza-
tions comparable to their western contemporaries.
This literature with its findings suggesting the leveling of social structure, as 
well as the inorganic origin, and social aloofness of political parties, leads most 
authors to ignore ideology or political preferences. However, in the words of 
Bornschier, “One of the reasons why it is sometimes difficult to identify social 
roots of political conflicts is methodological, or perhaps conceptual: our categories 
for describing social structure often lag behind our understanding of the conflicts 
themselves.”19 Consequently, the assessment of issue preferences and ideologies 
espoused by parties, and held by voters, may help us understand the nature of politi-
cal conflict and its structure.
an alternative strand of the literature pursues this goal. It focuses on how indi-
vidual party positions and voter preferences structure party competition and voting 
behavior in eastern europe. While initially largely theoretical, this literature has pro-
ceeded to generate hypotheses frequently tested through larger-N studies, often rely-
ing on various quantitative data sources assessing party positions, issue salience, and 
individual-level preferences and voting behavior.
These works generally proceed from the path-breaking study of Herbert 
Kitschelt which outlines a number of theoretical propositions concerning the poli-
tics of the region.20 First, Kitschelt suggests that east european politics are (or will 
become) structured in predictable patterns. Second, these patterns are less a func-
tion of traditionally and crudely understood social class, but rather of individuals’ 
skill endowments and how they convert into resources and capacities in the new 
post-communist regime. Third, these endowments guide individual political pref-
erences over key issue dimensions—social liberalism versus particularism / social 
conservatism / authoritarianism, and market versus state allocation of resources—
consequently structuring the space of party competition. Kitschelt thus expects that 
“individuals and groups who are confident that they will succeed in converting 
their assets into valuable resources in a capitalist market society will support par-
ties with libertarian-promarket outlooks. In contrast, those groups and individuals 
whose resources prove inconvertible will resist the marketization of economic 
relations and resort to authoritarian-nonmarket politics.”21 This means that the 
competition space in eastern europe should be unidimensional, combining the eco-
nomic left (state allocation of resources) with social conservatism, and the eco-
nomic right (market allocation of resources) with social liberalism. Responding to 
Kitschelt, evans and Whitefield propose a more case sensitive approach, arguing 
that the structure of party competition varies across the region as a function of 
economic development, levels of ethnic heterogeneity, and the historic status of the 
state.22 Their study consequently suggests a country-specific multidimensionality 
of party competition in the region.
These initial theoretical pieces herald a multiplicity of sophisticated, empirically 
oriented work on the structure of party competition in eastern europe. This literature 
is dominated by studies concentrating on a smaller set of cases, almost invariably 
including the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. These works tend to agree with 
evans and Whitefield23 on the country-specific multidimensionality of party compe-
tition.24 The Czech Republic is thus dominated by competition over the economy, 
while Hungary and Poland compete over cross-cutting cleavages defined by eco-
nomics, as well as religious and urban–rural divides, etc.
The primary explanation of these divergent forms of competition is found in the 
varying impact of the communist regime and its historical antecedents. The authors 
tend to distinguish between three communist regime types that have divergent 
effects: (1) bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes (Czech Republic), where competi-
tion is expected to revolve around economic issues; (2) national-communist 
regimes (Croatia, estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia), 
where liberalizing communist parties lead others to highlight historical, non-eco-
nomic divides; and (3) patrimonial communist regimes (Bulgaria, Romania, 
Serbia), where law and order issues and decommunization are expected to be sig-
nificant noneconomic sources of competition.25 Other authors additionally stress 
the importance of left party capacities and strategies,26 strength of the opposition, 
and transition speed.27
Simultaneously, a growing body of research assesses party competition structure 
across a wider range of counties in the region. Some of these studies share the coun-
try-specific multidimensional argumentation of the case-oriented works;28 however, 
a number of large-N studies tend to argue for unidimensionality across eastern 
europe. In line with Kitschelt,29 these works see party competition in eastern europe 
as divided between economically left-wing social conservatism and economically 
right-wing social liberalism—a pattern that is distinct from that of western europe.30 
The main explanatory factor for this eastern european exception is the central role of 
the communist experience, causing a uniform political association between state-
centered economics and political authoritarianism.31
The view that eastern european party competition shares a common unidimen-
sional structure that is a mirror image of the west is, however, challenged by recent 
empirical evidence. Using similar, large-N quantitative approaches, Bakker et al. and 
Rovny and edwards find that when disaggregated, eastern party systems manifest a 
number of distinctive competition patterns.32 Figure 1 demonstrates that some of 
these copy the west, with the economic left taking social liberal positions while the 
economic right adopts social conservatism. Strikingly, the variance in these competi-
tion patterns does not reflect the explanatory factors highlighted by the literature. 
These competition patterns do not coincide with different communist regime types, 
communist successor party strategies, or transition paths.
Avenues for Future Study of Party Competition in Eastern 
Europe
This literature leaves us with three unanswered questions. First, what is the 
dimensionality of eastern european party competition? Second, how should we 
bridge the aggregate uniformity postulated by some, and idiosyncratic diversity of 
eastern european party competition proposed by others? Finally, given that the 
dominant accounts of party competition patterns in the region do not explain much 
of its variance, what does? The persistence of these questions reflects the literature’s 
unease in striking a balance between sensitivity to case specifics on the one hand, 
and the search for general causal explanations on the other. While a typical analytical 
trade-off in social science research, more can be done to narrow this gap. The rest of 
this article suggests avenues in this regard.
Dimensionality
In terms of dimensionality, the divergent results are not only a function of method-
ology—pitting qualitative smaller-N studies that tend to propose country-specific 
multidimensionality, against quantitative large-N works that generally find regionwide 
unidimensionality. They are also a function of substantive focus. as Benoit and Laver 
emphatically argue, “the appropriate ‘dimensionality’ of some political space depends 
on the political problem at hand. There is no general ‘dimensionality’ that is applicable 
to any conceivable question regardless of context, but rather a range of possibilities 
that depend on which question we seek to answer.”33 Consequently, depending on the 
research problem at hand, it is appropriate for some studies to select multiple dimen-
sions or political issue items, while others focus on a unique dimension.
The question of “what number of dimensions” is thus the wrong one to ask. If 
proceeding quantitatively—that is, by analyzing the dimensional structure of multiple 
issue items using dimensional scaling techniques, such as multidimensional scaling, 
exploratory or confirmatory factor analyses—the answer to this question will be 
highly contingent on the nature and number of the items included in the calculation. a 
more fruitful approach is one that considers the salience of the political issues, ideally 
weighting party positional information by its importance,34 as it is key to consider not 
simply the bundling of issues but the bundling of relevant issues.
Figure 1
Aggregated and disaggregated political space
Source: Jan Rovny, “Communism, Federalism and ethnic Minorities: explaining Party Competition 
Patterns in eastern europe,” World Politics 66, no. 4 (2014).
The conceptual space of party competition should be conceived as a generic 
political map—a tool for plotting positions, distances, and movements of parties or 
voters. The number and nature of the dimensions of this map should be theoreti-
cally derived, and general enough to capture the variance of substantive interest. 
The association of the selected dimensions should be assumed as orthogonal.35 
This is obviously a stylized space, however, one that allows us to assess the layout, 
dimensional simplicity, and dimensional association, once we plot parties or voters 
in it.36
This approach may bring us back to the straightforward two-dimensional plane, 
spanning economic and sociocultural issues, proposed by Kitschelt two decades 
ago.37 However, depending on how actors fall in this space, we can assess whether 
the space is unidimensional (actors align) or not, whether economic issues position-
ally dominate sociocultural issues (greater dispersion over the economic than the 
sociocultural dimension) and vice versa, or whether these dimensions do not matter 
(erratic placement, defying known differences between actors). This approach, 
allowing the assessment of diverse party systems using a single dimensional space, 
is a modest step toward reconciling case specificity with the need for general analyti-
cal frames, a topic I now turn to.
Aggregate Uniformity versus Idiosyncratic Diversity
No student of eastern european party politics would be surprised to hear that par-
ties in the Czech Republic vie significantly over socioeconomic outlooks, while 
Polish parties diverge in their views of the role of the church in public life, and 
estonian parties differ in their approach to ethnolinguistic minorities. Indeed, many 
of the studies mentioned above go to great lengths to provide fascinating historical 
detail on these matters. Simultaneously, I am not aware of a comparative, empiri-
cally oriented analysis of party competition in the region that would consider the 
sources of divergence across cases as something other than historical peculiarities. 
Consequently, this engrossing variance in party competition patterns is relegated to 
the status of idiosyncratic diversity.
The large-N studies, on the contrary, tend to focus on such levels of aggregation 
that they miss this variance all together. While theoretically clean and empirically 
simple, the unidimensional conception of all eastern european party competition 
washes away much of interest. This conceptualization, for example, suggests compa-
rability of left parties across the region, combining left-wing economic preferences 
with socially conservative outlooks—a proposition that would not hold up if we 
compared, say, Bulgaria or Romania with Croatia or estonia. In short, this aggregate 
uniformity is not just simplifying, it may lead to invalid conclusions.
We can do better. We are in a position to develop and test broadly applicable 
theories of party competition structure and voting behavior in eastern europe; theo-
ries that can account for cross-national variance, while using general, theoretically 
derived predictors that do not reduce to country dummies. a good place to start is 
back at the beginning. The pioneering theoretical work of evans and Whitefield 
provides us with a set of key determinants of party competition in the region that 
subsequent literature juggles, but does not convincingly pin down in a coherent 
theory.38 Besides the widely studied variable of economic development, evans and 
Whitefield point us to consider ethnic heterogeneity and statehood. I take up their 
suggestion in the following section that considers what may account for the vari-
ance of party competition in eastern europe, and proposes a first step in building a 
general vote choice model.
Explaining the Variance in Party Competition Patterns
as partly demonstrated in Figure 1, the patterns of party competition in eastern 
europe are more complex than those suggested by the quantitative, large-N works 
reviewed. Simultaneously, this variance does not seem to coincide with dominant 
explanations considering communist regime types, communist successor party strat-
egies, or transition paths.39 The extensive focus of the literature on communist lega-
cies has provided much clarity to our understanding of post-communist politics, 
while simultaneously distracting our attention from other significant sources of 
political conflict that may have played a role in shaping party competition in the 
region. While frequently mentioned by various studies,40 the effect of ethnicity, 
statehood, and state building as well as religious divides on party competition struc-
turing have received limited comparative attention.
The insufficient focus on these noneconomic, historical factors of party competi-
tion has four likely sources. The first is the initial preponderance of the traditional 
view that the destruction caused by the Second World War and by communism sim-
ply erased or at least reshaped these characteristics in eastern europe. The second is 
that “historical legacies seem to matter more . . . as the post-communist transforma-
tion takes its course,”41 and thus it is only lately that we become aware of these fac-
tors. Third, political science literature generally assumes that ethnic and state-building 
divides do not produce ideological competition, but rather lead to non-ideological, 
particularistic conflict.42 Consequently, their impact on the space of party competi-
tion, as well as on party and voter placements, has been overlooked. Finally, the 
underappreciation of the role of ethnicity has been further deepened by the empirical 
focus on the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, which are among the most ethni-
cally homogeneous countries in the region. Nonetheless, the case-oriented literature 
provides ample evidence of the significance of religious, ethnic, and state-building 
divides that—together with economic conflict—frame the structure of party compe-
tition across eastern europe. We are thus faced with the challenge of formulating 
general theoretical propositions concerning these variables that would capture the 
variance of party competition patterns and voting choices in the region. The rest of 
this article aims to serve as an introductory step in this direction.
A Model of Party Competition in Eastern Europe
In order to demonstrate the possibility to capture the variance in party competi-
tion in eastern europe with a parsimonious theoretical model, this section formulates 
a simple model of vote choice, predicting the probability to vote for left parties in 
eastern europe. The model centers around four major sources of political divides 
emphasized by the literature: the economy, ethnicity, statehood, and religion. I start 
out by discussing the basic theoretical expectations before specifying the model, and 
then test it on recent survey data from ten eastern european countries.
Key Divisions in Eastern Europe
The first source of division, the economy, is not only well discussed by the lit-
erature on the region, it also closely reflects the economic oppositions of established 
democracies. as in the West, economic divides in the east pit actors supportive of 
market mechanisms against those favoring state-led forms of economic regulation 
and distribution. I thus expect that greater support for redistribution and state inter-
vention in the economy will increase the likelihood of left vote.
The impact of ethnicity and statehood on party competition patterns in eastern 
europe is less obvious. My recent research suggests that state-building and ethnic 
minority issues are closely intertwined.43 an interaction between the experiences of 
communist federalism and partisan responses to ethnic minorities importantly shapes 
party competition structure in eastern europe. Specifically, I argue that various histori-
cal institutional mechanisms create an association between left parties and ethnic 
minorities from former federal centers. Consequently, “where a politically salient 
minority originates from the center of a dissolved communist federation [the Czech 
lands, Russia or Serbia], parties that lean to the left economically adopt implicitly toler-
ant or explicitly supportive stances on ethnic issues, while the economic right espouses 
ethnic nationalism. On the contrary, where a politically salient ethnic minority origi-
nates from somewhere other than a federal center, the economic left is induced to 
scapegoat ethnic minorities while the economic right adopts tolerant ethnic views.”44
I thus expect that in countries where the main ethnic minority originates from the 
federal center (estonia, Latvia, Slovenia), ethnic minorities will be significantly more 
likely to vote for left parties than ethnic majorities. In countries with significant ethnic 
minorities from other backgrounds (Bulgaria, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia), ethnic 
minorities will be significantly less likely to support left parties than ethnic majorities. 
Finally, in countries without politically significant ethnic minorities (Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland), ethnicity will not have a significant effect on vote.
Religion has been a significant social and political force in eastern europe.45 even 
under communist rule, churches “not only provided social and spiritual services for 
the masses, they also played an important part in the prodemocracy movement which 
culminated in the democratic transformations of 1989.”46 Consequently, Borowik 
notes that “the atheization of eastern europe, if anyone believed in it, was a myth, 
popularized above all by [communist] ideologists, party activists and the propagan-
dists.”47 The arrival of democratic rule ushered in not only religious freedoms but 
also a role reversal for religious organization. From being constrained and repressed, 
religious organizations were restored as important components of society.48 The 
church forms political preferences through its values and teachings that are promoted 
both by the political influence and participation of religious elites (clergy), as well as 
through popular dissemination via believers.49 This way, as in other regions of the 
world, the church exerts conservative influence over political questions related to 
religious teaching, such as moral and reproductive issues.50
Simultaneously, Whitefield suggests the dominant denomination of a country 
moderates the effect of religiosity in politics.51 While “Catholicism affects social and 
ideological divisions in historically Catholic countries, Orthodoxy has very little 
effect on attitudes or cleavages where it is the dominant religion.”52 The region can 
in fact be meaningfully divided into three religious areas. First, the countries with 
historically significant Protestant populations where a majority today claims to have 
no religion (Czech Republic, estonia, Latvia), second, the countries with a predomi-
nantly Catholic population (Hungary, Poland, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia), and 
finally the countries with a predominantly Orthodox population (Bulgaria, Romania). 
Consequently, while I expect that religiosity will reduce the likelihood of supporting 
left parties, this effect will likely differ according to the dominant denomination of 
the given system.
Model Specification and Analysis
This theoretical discussion leads to a specification of the following model of left 
vote, which, besides the variables of theoretical interest, controls for the usual social 
characteristics: gender, age, education, and wealth. The model also controls for com-
munist legacies by including a variable that addresses the speed of democratic tran-
sition.53 The utilized variables are summarized in Table a1 in the appendix.
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The model is estimated with a logistic regression explaining the vote for left-wing 
versus right-wing parties (see Table a3 in the appendix for details concerning party 
classification) in eastern europe, using the 2009 european election Study, which 
covers the ten eastern european countries that were members of the european Union 
at the time (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia). Figure 2 summarizes the key results (based on 
model 2), while Table a2 in the appendix provides the estimation details. The subse-
quent discussion focuses on the full model (model 2).
The model correctly classifies more than 71 percent of the observations and produces 
a pseudo-R2 of 0.175, which is comparable to vote choice models for western europe.54 
The results support the theoretical expectations outlined above. In terms of economic 
preferences, the top panels in Figure 2 show that voters in favor of greater redistribution 
of resources and greater state intervention in the economy are significantly more likely 
to vote for left-wing parties. The effect of economic preferences on vote choice is, how-
ever, relatively modest in comparison with the effect of ethnicity and religiosity.
as expected, the effect of ethnicity is significantly moderated by the origin of the 
politically salient ethnic minority. The bottom left panel of Figure 2 shows that where 
the presence of ethnic minorities is insignificant (the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland), there ethnic minority status has no effect on vote choice. However, where a 
significant ethnic minority comes from the center of a dissolved communist federa-
tion (estonia, Latvia, Slovenia), there ethnic minorities are more than 85 percent 
likely to vote for left-wing parties, while the majority population is only about 30 
percent likely to do so, ceteris paribus. On the contrary, in countries where a 
Figure 2
Predicting Left Vote
Note: Predicted probabilities with 95 percent confidence intervals.
significant ethnic minority comes from elsewhere than a defunct federal center 
(Bulgaria, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia), ethnic minorities are significantly less 
likely to support left-wing parties than ethnic majorities.
Religiosity also manifests an effect on vote choice, which is moderated by the 
dominant religious denomination, as expected. The bottom right panel of Figure 2 
demonstrates that in countries where most of the population report not having a reli-
gion (the Czech Republic, estonia, and Latvia), religiosity has a weak negative effect 
on left vote. as religiosity increases, the likelihood of left vote decreases. In pre-
dominantly Orthodox countries, religiosity has no significant impact on vote. Finally, 
in predominantly Catholic countries, religiosity has a strong significant effect. as 
religiosity increases from its minimum to its maximum, the probability to vote for 
left-wing parties declines from about 55 to 16 percent, ceteris paribus. as a note of 
caution, it should be added that these precise results are particular to the data and 
model specification. Nonetheless, they highlight the key relationships between voter 
preferences or characteristics and their vote choice.
Conclusion
This article has reviewed the lively academic field studying party competition 
patterns in eastern europe. It has highlighted a divide between works that focus on 
structural aspects of party systems and party organization on the one hand, and stud-
ies that concentrate on the patterning of individual party positions and voter prefer-
ences on the other. While generating a number of conclusions about the nature of 
party competition in the region, as well as a wealth of specific knowledge, this 
article suggests that the literature raises three important, unanswered questions. 
First, the literature disagrees on the number of separate political dimensions that 
structure party competition in eastern europe. Second, the literature is divided 
between country-focused accounts that find idiosyncratic diversity across the region, 
producing limited predictions or explanations of competition patterns, and aggre-
gated studies that overlook the diversity of these patterns. Consequently, and finally, 
the literature does not sufficiently account for what may explain the variation in 
competition patterns in the region.
Building on previous and ongoing research, this article proposed ways to address 
these three questions. It argued for the importance of generally applicable theoretical 
accounts that are, nonetheless, capable of capturing seemingly country-specific vari-
ation. Indeed, the main message of this article is that it is possible to build theoreti-
cally rooted accounts of party competition patterning that explain reasonable portions 
of observed variance, even in eastern europe.
The article thus suggested that rather than seeking to “discover” the dimensionality 
of eastern european party competition, we should deductively derive dimensional 
spaces as generic maps for capturing the key political conflicts of interest. While obvi-
ous simplifications, such dimensional conceptualizations allow the assessment of the 
layout, dimensional simplicity, and dimensional association, demonstrating any speci-
ficities of particular political systems within a common frame. Similarly, to reconcile 
country-specific accounts with aggregated large-N studies in order to identify the pre-
dictors of party competition patterns in eastern europe, the article proposed sensitive 
theorization of some of the key indicators implicated in both large- and small-N research. 
It namely argued for the inclusion of economic divides, ethnicity, state-building experi-
ences, and religiosity in the explanations of party competition patterns in the east.
To demonstrate the utility of this approach, the article finally built a theoretical 
model of party competition in eastern europe and tested it by estimating the vote for 
left-wing parties across ten eastern european countries. While a rather simple model, 
its characteristics and results, nonetheless, emphasize that, despite its natural com-
plexities, political competition in eastern europe can be meaningfully captured with-
out resorting to country-specific idiosyncrasies. The model reminds us of the 
possibility of formulating general theoretical propositions, sensitive enough to 
address greater diversity of outcomes.
It is needless to say that the trade-off between parsimony and validity is present in 
all attempts at scientific generalization. While no exception, this article has empha-
sized the generalizability of the political experiences that underpin a good portion of 
the diversity of party competition in eastern europe. With careful theoretical consid-
eration, it may turn out that various, seemingly country-specific, idiosyncrasies form 
more general patterns. I believe that such careful consideration should be on the 
agenda of scholars studying eastern european party competition in the future.
Appendix
Table A1
Variables Used
Variable Meaning Range Variable Source/Code
Redistribution Respondent preference over 
resource redistribution
1–5 eeS, q63 (reversed to range from low 
to high redistribution preference)
Intervention Respondent preference over state 
intervention in the economy
1–5 eeS, q61
Religiosity Respondent degree of religiosity 0–10 eeS, q119
Denomination Religious denomination of coun-
try: 0 = mostly atheist; 1 = 
mostly Catholic; 2 = mostly 
Orthodox
0–2 author (based on CIa World 
Factbook)
Minority status Respondent member of ethnic 
minority: 0 = no, 1 = yes
0–1 eeS, q108, coded 1 if respondent sees 
himself/herself as either national and 
belonging to another group; or just 
belonging to another group.
(continued)
Variable Meaning Range Variable Source/Code
Minority type Type of significant ethnic minority 
in country: 0 = insignificant 
minority; 1 = minority from fed-
eral center; 2 = other minority
0–2 author
Female Respondent is 0 = male, 1 = 
female
0–1 eeS, q102, recoded
age Respondent age eeS, q103, year of birth recoded to 
age
education Respondent education 0–6 eeS, v200
Wealth Respondent wealth 1–7 eeS, q120
Speed of tran-
sition
The year a country became fully 
democratic
1990–
1998
author, and watershed election years 
based on Vachudova (2006)a
a. M. a. Vachudova, “Democratization in Postcommunist europe: Illiberal Regimes and the Leverage of
International actors” (Center for european Studies Working Paper Series #139), http://aei.pitt.edu/9023/ 
(accessed 23 September, 2014). CIa World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/, accessed January 28, 2015. 
Table A2
Logit Model of Vote Choice
1 2
Left Vote Left Vote
Redistribution 0.161*** 0.179***
(0.0292) (0.0296)
Intervention 0.0775*** 0.0625**
(0.0286) (0.0289)
Religiosity −0.0666*** −0.0671***
(0.0212) (0.0212)
Religion type 1 −0.727*** −0.740***
(0.135) (0.136)
Religion type 2 −2.693*** −2.955***
(0.220) (0.225)
Religion type 1 × Religiosity −0.117*** −0.116***
(0.0262) (0.0263)
Religion type 2 × Religiosity 0.0829** 0.0996***
(0.0329) (0.0331)
Minority status −0.137 −0.131
(0.270) (0.270)
Minority type 1 0.166* −0.00977
(0.0954) (0.0986)
(continued)
Table A1 (continued)
1 2
Left Vote Left Vote
Minority type 2 1.724*** 0.738***
(0.113) (0.179)
Minority type 1 × Minority 
status
2.862*** 2.865***
(0.354) (0.354)
Minority type 2 × Minority 
status
−1.254*** −1.449***
(0.355) (0.360)
Female 0.0988 0.0779
(0.0700) (0.0705)
age 0.0224*** 0.0231***
(0.00208) (0.00210)
education −0.149*** −0.123***
(0.0305) (0.0308)
Wealth −0.0944*** −0.0886***
(0.0305) (0.0307)
Speed of transition 0.176***
(0.0244)
Constant −0.917*** −352.1***
(0.255) (48.57)
Log-likelihood −2561.4952 −2534.104
aIC 5156.99 5104.208
BIC 5266.224 5219.867
Pseudo-R2 0.166 0.175
Observations 4 562 4562
Note: aIC = akaike information criterion; BIC = Bayesian information criterion. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Table A2 (continued)
Table A3
Party classification used in logit model
Left Parties
Bulgaria KzB
Czech Republic CSSD
Czech Republic KSCM
estonia SDe
estonia eK
Hungary MSZP
Latvia SC
Lithuania LSDP
(continued)
Table A3 (continued)
Left Parties
Poland SLD
Romania PSD
Slovenia SD
Slovakia Smer
Slovakia KSS
Right Parties
Bulgaria DSB
Bulgaria RZS
Bulgaria geRB
Bulgaria NDST
Bulgaria DPS
Czech Republic ODS
Czech Republic KDU-CSL
estonia IRL
estonia eR
Hungary Fidesz-M
Hungary MDF
Hungary SZDSZ
Hungary KDNP
Latvia V
Lithuania TS
Lithuania LCS
Lithuania LRLS
Lithuania NS
Lithuania LLRa
Poland PO
Poland PiS
Romania PNL
Romania PD-L
Romania PC
Romania UDMR
Slovenia SDS
Slovenia SNS
Slovenia Zares
Slovenia LDS
Slovenia SLS-SMS
Slovenia NSI
Slovakia KDH
Slovakia SF
Slovakia SMK
Slovakia SDKU-DS
Note: Left parties are defined as communist, socialist, or social democratic. Right parties are defined as 
conservative, Christian democratic, liberal, or regionalist.
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